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IHC-MM-10/74

22 May 1974

#### INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION HANDLING COMMITTEE of the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

#### Office of the Chairman

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC)	
SUBJECT : Memorandum for DCI from on New Intelligence Presentation Means	STAT
1. At the IHC meeting on 24 April 74, offered to share with the Committee his memorandum to the DCI on New Intelligence Presentation Means. That memorandum, dated 1 May 1974, is attached.	STAT
2. Included are the handwritten comments made by the DCI toon this subject. I think you will be very interested to note the personal attention that Mr. Colby is giving to this subject and his willingness to focus rather specifically on these matters.	
3. I am sure that will be interested in any comments you may care to offer in connection with his further exploration of this general topic. You may communicate with him direct or through me, as you prefer. This subject will be a matter of continuing interest for the IHC.	
	STAT

Acting Chairman,

Att

STAT

STAT

- Distribution:
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1 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT ...: New Intelligence Presentation Means

This describes the rationale by which I am approaching the subject.

#### Problem

To discover new approaches to the way in which information media techniques and technology and related ongoing R&D could be employed to extend user and analyst capacity for analyzing, perceiving and understanding intelligence.

#### Introduction

It has some utility to restate the problem so that through redundancy there is refinement. What I anticipate is that through understanding the relationship among

- the process of organization of concepts, ideas and facts,
- 2) the analytical methods which give new insights to these, and
- 3) the applicability of media techniques and technology,

the Intelligence Community can lessen the impedance

- to the flow of intelligence between analyst and user, and
- to the understanding of the data processor's facts by the analyst.

These three interact in what I would call a "feasibility equation," which I will describe subsequently. I anticipate that what is being reported here will be a demonstration of the plausibility of the course which is recommended, i.e., the "strategic" view of how to go at solving the "problem." In practice, i.e., "tactically" the problem will be treated by meeting presentation needs in an iterative way on a one-by-one basis -- at least till more sophistication develops regarding "concept transfer" between intellects.

I anticipate also that there will be few, if any, truly unique, optimum solutions to presenting information but that there will be a spectrum of possibilities any one of which might be optimized to the needs of a particular intelligence user or analyst. What ought to develop then if we are successful is

- 1) some primitive approaches to giving really new insights to structually non-trivial concepts and to complicated aggregation of facts, and
- 2) a management approach to satisfying user preferences for gaining those insights when the extant "bag of tricks" is inadequate.

The essence of developing new means of presentation of intelligence lies, I believe, in the skein that must be found between

- the finished intelligence producer's analytical construct or approach to finding the meaning of facts, and
- the media by which his conclusions can be transmitted to the user.

If the producers use conventional approaches, then conventional use of media will result. If, however, his approaches are conditioned

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by the <u>full</u> capabilities of available media, then the analytical approach itself will foster the new presentation means. The skein between facts to be analyzed and intelligence to be presented is to be found -- I assert -- in the analytical methodologies which are employed. In fact, depending upon user or analyst preference many analytical methodologies might link a given set of facts and a given medium of presentation.

Yes

Yes

To avoid being unremittingly theoretical, there follows a listing of some

- relevant problems of analysis,
- analytical methodologies, and
- media technical capabilities.

#### Problems of Analysis

Problems of analysis means those kinds of tasks faced in certain offices of CIA, DDI and DDS&T; in DIA, DI and DE; and in State, INR. As other departments of government evolve their understanding of the role which intelligence can play in supporting national interest activities perhaps new tasks or new perspectives of old tasks will develop. Table 1 lists a number of problems, some specific in nature, other general.

All of the problems listed in Table 1 are familiar. All of them suggest or require a quantification of the facts involved. This is a necessity for analytical methodologies any one of which by its nature excludes intuition, i.e., a given set of facts must give rise to results which are invariant as to analyst. One can, of course, change results by changing analytical methods, hypotheses in analyses or in tolerating varying levels of confidence.

There is an interest philosophical ques here: - How do you inst were: - How do you inst instrument on and wish

#### TABLE 1

#### Problems of Analysis

- 1. Indications and warning "thermometer"
- 2. Weapon systems' measures and portrayal.
- 3. Uncertainty measures and portrayal
- 4. Military economics analysis
- 5. Trade-off measures and portrayal
- 6. Crisis situation analysis
- 7. Current intelligence (and cable) dissemination
- 8. Prediction elections, deployments, etc.
- 9. Verification (SALT/MBFR) measures of confidence
- 10. Decision-making process
- 11. Projection of trends
- 12. Succession analysis
- 13. Transaction analysis
- 14. Multi-parameter data analysis

Analytical Methodologies

Analytical methodologies abound. Table 2 probably only scratches the surface. The table clearly indicates a richness of opportunity for trying new approaches to analysis and therefore perhaps to presentation of results. Some of these methodologies are being employed presently in CIA and DIA, possibly elsewhere in the community. All of these are quantitatively based, most require high-speed computers for practicality, and all have potential for giving new insights to old problems. Some methodologies by their nature will demand new media for meaningful presentation of results, others could permit analysts new, clearer or even differing insights.

#### Technique and Technology

In my experience -- and from the research I have done in recent weeks -- technique and technology are the least developed or exploited aspects of the feasibility equation, especially with respect to reducing impedance to concept transfer. So far I have tried to discover the "dimensions" of intelligence presentations as a way both of understanding our current means of presentation and of stimulating new means. The parameters which presently appear adequate are five\*:

- Fixed or changeable content;
- 2) Symbols vs charts (i.e., digital vs analog);
- 3) Dimensionability (e.g., B&W vs color);
- 4) Static (stationary) vs dynamic display; and
- 5) Interactive capability.

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<sup>\*</sup> The number and categorization might change.

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APPENDIX

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## SOME UNUSUAL "00111" MEANS OF CONVEYING IDEAS

This Appendix is really just a primitive start at a more thorough survey of symbolic, textual and graphical means of conveying ideas. The means are unusual only in the sense that they are not commonly used in Intelligence Community publications. As the illustrations which are used have been borrowed from a large number of sources and are out of context, both of the original source and of possible intelligence context, they suffer somewhat. However, some brief comment is given opposite each as a way of showing some relevance.

\* :

The illustration opposite was produced by cooperation between DDI/OBGI/Cartographic and IC/MPRRG. It is a map of Africa in which dollars expended on intelligence in given countries is displayed in vertical extend above the country. The technique could be applied to any of a number of geographic variables of social, demographic, economic or political activity.

The illustration opposite is typical of perspective in graphic plots. The logo beneath the illustration explains what is being described here; this presentation means might have utility in trying to show the movement of an entity in which three dimensions are significant. One example of this would be the absolute amount of dollar resources which a given country expends on defense and social programs both plotted as a function of time. One might use the same type of plot for descriptions of resources expended on PHOTINT, SIGINT and HUMINT as a function of time in which hash marks for fiscal years could be employed.

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This illustration opposite is the final example of the use of perspective which might aid in conveying a concept. One might imagine that in some type of operations such a view could be very useful during the preparatory stage.

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The illustration opposite describes a way of producing a newspaper at a distance, and in principle is always in use in the intelligence community through LDX/


periodic reports
like this (eg.
the NID to outside

Worshington?)

March 22-2 1971 IEEE Special Issue

## The Toshiba News





#### TELENEWSPAPER AGE DAWNS


Toshiba Home Facsimile Unit Promises New Era of Instant Communication

Can Be Mass-produced

for Every Home

#### A New Method of Home News Evaluation

#### The Toshiba System: Compact, Inexpensive



Transmisson Speed: Five Minutes

# BEST COPY Available

The illustration opposite gives a schematic of some of the branch points in arriving at a decision. If, in regard to the DDI/OPR bayesian estimate of conflict possibility, each analyst were to make a decision tree, then after the fact the use of the decision tree could help them to illustrate their understanding of their colleagues' thinking and a subsequent time-series analysis might indicate significant events which changed thought processes.

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The illustration opposite makes two points: (1) that there are a variety of unusual graph papers which might aid readers in an understanding of statistical data, and (2) that statistical data can be smoothed somewhat as an aid to an understanding of data. The model opposite summarizes a table which had about 80 entries.

